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THE BATTLE FOR EASTERN GERMANY
By KLAUS MEHNEH.T
J/III1!1 c,,,II/l</i!1II11 or Ixlil/ril "J IlIi" ,,"u.r u"lIieh "<Jl~ bum clIlI(J! "/IIiUM!!" or
""ec/,yi,·t'· were PI./J, ill tilt /Illude by tJlht.rll .,:lIich JuUo«:ecl thClIl, OJ COl/rliC Wt rill
/lui h,Ol/' ,,'lwI '/lUY ..Iill come .. but O/'C thi/l{I ill cut(/;II: tht battlo "'hieh h/lll bun ",ginp
Oil tilt t.l,/ltU/I Jo:,.,f'lJ'Ptl'" jrullt ";lIce Jllllllar!! /2 ;~. w< Jar (II, lIum, IUllteria/, and
'"""e" ;w'uhed ure cOllcerned, the ureatelll oj tl•• pre.c/,l, W<lr.
No.3
BETWEEN the middle of August 1944llnd January 11, 1"45, the Enstern :Frontnorth of the Carpathians hllJ'dly changed
at all. The Soviets had succeeded in
c8u~il1g the German troops to withdraw from
E~toni" anel eastern Latvia and hltd rcached
thl' Baltic Sen. 011 a lIanow front !.letween
Libau Lllld Melne'l, thus cutting off the Gt~mlan
forces in KlIrland from It land cOlllwotion with
Eallt PruSlSin. OtherwiMl', however. a <-om,
pnrisOlI !.let w(.'Cn 0111' prc.~nt mal' ami that
prinlt'd ill 0111' O(·toher i"sul' uf 1\144 (p. 22U)
Ilhows mon' or 1('<1:1 the IlI\JllC front line which,
at the beginning (If ,Jallunry, lIpproximately
followed the eastern and lloutheQ.<ltern frontier
of Ell.:lt Prus.'lia, the ]\ltrev Ri\'(~r, thc \'i,;tula
Hivt'r, nnd the nurtlteal'ltern lllopcs of the Cur-
pnthian8.
Ou the wcstern bunk" uf the river Larrier
formed by the 1'\arc'" It-IIU the Vi~tulu, the
Soviet-~ had fhe iruportunt brirlgeheadll, two on
the 1'\ lueV (Rozan ami Herock) ami th rce on
t,he Vistula (Wa.rku, Pulaw.", anti Bamnow),
The ll1st of these, nallled ufter the t,o",n of
Buanow in Germun comlllunique~ ulld n.fter
the town of Sandomjer~ in Soviet commulliques,
was by far the Inrgest, including 111'1 it did lin
area of about 2.000 lKJuure kilonwtcr:l ILlld ex,
tending 70 kilomcterlJ <louthwt,;;t frolll ~nnuo,
mien along the \'Istuill. Sill<'e thc COllr<le of
the war on Ihe Eastern Front. hud ren:llll'd tl1l'
limited signiticunco of river,; lUI lIlilitary ob"taclf'll.
the Germau command dl'l'Ii:lt-(",1 frolll un uttempt
t.() des1,roy t.he. e bridgeheads und cOlltcntl'f1
itself witlt pI'Cventing their further oxplllll!ion
by fortifications.
TilL STAIn
(;t>rlllllll rel'0rls during till' IUle lllltllllill und
the willt(·f·. el'lIK'(·iull.\' sincI' 1111' Inidell(' of
Dec 'Ill IJer, "llm\'(·d I Ita I till' ~o,·il-tl'l Wt'rl' I1l1ing
thC'ir britl~l'heads witlt \'lIst lIllllnt it i,'s of troops
:UIU 1I1111eriul llnd 111011 Ii!!'." W('I'(' u6u Lringing
u IJ cXtrcwdy illl'UlIg furccli lu the eutire rt'-
Illainder of the E1Uitern l"ront between the
Baltic and the Carpathians, The main oon-
centration Wll8 observed in the bridgehead of
Barllnow, which was in the St!ctor of the
I Ukrainian Front,
During the 8('cond week of January, indica-
tions mounted that a great Soviet offensive
wus imminent. It began on Junuary 12, first
in the t!cctor of the I Ukrainian }'ront, Il.nd
spread within the n('xt twelve <lays over the
entire Ell8tcru l"ront.
The Six Soviet Fronts




1 Hnllie: BngnulI~ 1111 Junllary 2~
III Whil(' RII' -j"l1 CII.."I\ nkllu\·~k\· 13
lJ While HIISIlinll Ruko8.s0\· ·k\, ' 1-'
1 While HU811ill.1I ,I uko\' , 14
1 Ukrainiun "011 \'e \' 12
JV Ukmillinn POlr;,\' lli
A compnrisOIl of this tnllll' with thut publidhed
ill ollr i~>:luU of O<:t.ob"r 1U44 >:lhows that the
1 ""hite Hm;;;iull F/'Out. COllllllllllllt'tl ill SlIlllmer
by MUI'Shul ltoko;<so,"sk.r. 11:11'1 Leen t.llken over
by :\lar'Khnl .Juko\', while Rokosl'Iovsky wa.'!
gi"clI the II Wbiu., Ru' ian Frollt formerly
uncleI' (;\'nel'ul Zakharov,
On tho wholl'. the st'<lrling dllt-es uf th- Soviet
ulfclISivt:R IIrt· ident ieul ill tllC German and
~uviel rcporl,., Two eXt:C'ptioll'" are formed by
t.he otfl'llsin's uf the 1 Baltic lind III \\ hito
Hussinn Fro II Is. ~It)s(,ow hn!'4 It ha Lit of ollly
11.1lllvllllt'ing the ,'XUI·t bt'gUlllillg of hlrge,t!ca]e
u!ft>llsin'/i if Ihl'sc Itll ,'e It·d llfter l. few dn,}'ll to
llucees>!c" "isi hit' on 1Il1lpS. \\'helw\'er this it!
1I0t th' ('11:;('. thl' UIIIIOUIlCl'/Ul'nl. i~ either deht\'cd
ur (,lItin:l." "mitt"d. Th",.:. for illl'ltunct', 't.he
("HlllUlIlliC(\I('s flf tilt' l'im"icls 11t·",'/' VOll mcn-
lio/ll'fl the oIT('II'i,,' ('O/lU"l:1CU with lurgc forces
Ly t.heir I Baltic: Frolll u~ZlLi/l;;t the Gerlllll/l
t rU1jps ill KUl'llllltl. Tllis ufft'/lsin t.hl' fourl II
uf itl! k.iuu-bcgllll 011 JUlluar.r ~.j, amI within
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a week scores of divisions were embroiled in it.
But neither the hoped-for breakthrough to
Libau nor any other territorial gains material·
ized. (The first three Soviet Kurland offen-
sives took place from October 26 to November
7, 1944. from November 19 to 25, 1944, and
from December 21, 1944, to JILDuary 2, 1945.)
The offensive of the 111 White Rus..~ia.n Front
began on January 13; but as it was least suc-
cessful among all the offensi vcs, with the
exception of Bagramyan's, it was only an-
nounced on January 19, when PillkaUen feU
into the hands of the Red Army after bitter
fighting. Moreover, no starting date was men-
troned.
TBlIl J'IBST )'OUR WEEKS
The Soviet winter offensive can be traced in
detail, sa German and Soviet reports agree
strikingly on its geographical course. It stands
to reason that, in view of their advance, the
Soviet communiques show off with the names
of occupied localities as soon as possible. If,
however, the German communiques published
the names of abandoned localities even before
the Soviets, this only proves how much the
German High Command is endeavoring to keep
its own people accurately informed about the
course of the fighting, particularly in view of
the grave implications of this fighting. And
The Eutem Front during the firat four weeks of the Soviet winter offeD.llive (January 12 to
February ~. 19'6). Red woe indioate the approximate oouriltl of t.he front from week to week
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although the getting under way of the winter
offensive took twelve da,ys, the German side
W88 within the first day or so fully aware of
the fact that this was going to be tAe Soviet
offensive. On January 14, German commen·
taries were alrcady speaking of "the greatest
winter battle of the war" having started.
The accompanying map gives an idea of the
chief e\-ents.
The I krainian Front was given the task of
capturing Silesia, of forming the left flank in
the attack on Berlin, and breaking through to
Moravia (former Ol.cchoslovakia) at Mihrisch-
Ostran, where the River Oder, coming from
Moravia, hali forced its way through the moun-
taius to Silcsia. Konycv's armies were sup.
ported on the left wing by the far weaker
troops of the JV Ukrainian l<'ront, which have
hitherto not been involved in large-scale fight-
iug and which marched along the northern
slopes of the Carpathians toward the west.
ilaving succeeded by a tremendous artillery
barrage in brcaking the German ring around
the Baranow bridgehead, Konyev't1 troops
advanced through the thinly populated Polish.
Silellian plain and reached the Oder, somewhere
between Kosel and Breslau. Their progress
into the industrilll region of Upper Silesia, one
of the most thickly populated areas in Europe,
WIUI much slower. While the German troops only
withdrew beforc Konyev's offensive after hard
fighting and step by step, they gave ground on
their right wing, i.e., where they were facing
Petro.v's forces, without strong pre8Sure in
ol'der to maintain contact with the German
troops withdrawing to Silesia.
Marshal ,'ukov's I White RU88ian Front,
which was equipped with even stronger armored
units, had the greatest successes to show from
the point of view of distances covered. Ita
offeDBive consisted of two main thrustd. The
first, more southern one started from the two
bridgeheads of Warka and Pulawy-which were
joined np on the third day of t,he offensive-
and led via Litzmannstadt, KaLisch, and through
the triangle formed by the Rivers Warthe and
Oder to the middle reaches of t.he Oder in the
region of Ktistriu, Frankfurt an der Oder, and
l"tirst.enberg. The second thrust., coming from
the bridgehead of Warka, was directed north.
eastward, causing the abandonment of the ruins
of Warsaw by the German troops and leading
down the Vietllia "ia Wloclawek, Hohensalza.
and Bromberg into Pomerania.
The object set for the II White R.u88ian
]·'ront WIUl the isolation of East Prussia from
the Reich by a thrust along the lower Vistula
and, in conjunction with the ill White Russian
Front, the oonquest of East Prussia. In the
northernmost sector, Bagramyan's troops also
took part to a small extent in this battle and
occupied Memol on January 28, after the Ger-
mans had given up this town because its posi.
tion was too isolated. The offeDBive ag&in8t
East Prussia went through regionll in which the
Russian armies of the Great War had suffered
terrible defeats (Tannenberg, August 26·30,
1914; Masurian Lakes, September (;·15, 1914).
This time, the Russians had chosen a season in
which East Prussia's main protection of a
geographical nature, its countless lakes and
dense forests, was ineffective, The lakes were
frozen; and the Soviets, instead of ha\ing to
fight for the narrow marshy or wooded strips
of land betweeu the Lakes, could advance with
their tanks aeross the smooth open surfaces of
the lakes. Hence the Germans were forced to
gi\'e up the greater part of El\IIt Prussia to the
oncoming 1I0od and t,o wit,hdraw to an area in
the north coutlillting mainly of the towns of
Konig berg a.nd Elbing and Illl irregular strip
of land between them.
By the end of the fourth week of the Soviet
offeusive (February 9) the front line followed
on the whole the River Odor. The Germans
IltiLI had considerable forces east of the Oder,
especially ill "':ast Prussia and in Elbing,
Maritlnburg, Graudeuz, Schneidcmuhl, and Po·
sen; furthermore, they held a wide coastal strip
between the lower Oder and the lower Vistula,
i.e., between Stcttin and Danzig, and numerOU8
bridgeheads, especially those of Kustrin, Frank.
furt, }<'tirstenberg, and Breslau, as well lUI the
tenaciously defended industrial region of Upper
Silesia and the area betweeu Ratibor and
Bielitz protecting the gateway to Moravia.
The 'oviets, on the other hand, possessed
several bridgeheads on the western bank of the
Oder, pa.rticularly-from north to south-
Goritz, south of Frankfurt, at Furstenberg,
Neusalz, Stcinau, Parchwitz, Maltsch, Oblau,
Brieg, Oppeln. and Meehnitz, whence
they hoped to encircle Breslau and carry out
an attack on Berlin.
HU~OARY
Although the present review is concerned
wit.h events on the front north of the Carpa-
thil\J18, we must add a few wordfl about the
Hungarian front. It WRS here that Ute Sovict.s
met wit,h con!liderable reverses whieh prevented
them from supporting their main offensive
with another drive south of the Carpathians.
The review of the Balkan {rout appearing in
thjs magazine (January 1945) dealt with the
event.s up to the end of November. In the
course of December one Soviet urmy conquered
the triangle between the Rivers Danube and
Drau up to Lake Balaton, while another Soviet
army, coming from the northeast, moved west
alone: both banks of t,he Danube above its
great bend. By joining hands, the two armies
cut otT Budapest from the west. But on
January 2 a powerful Germall count.eroffensive
began in the great Danube bend. The t.erman
right wing recaptured Stuhlweissenburg and
pushed toward Budapest from there; the left
wing recaptured Gran.
110 THE XXtb CENTURY
Meanwhile the Gormn.n·Hungarian garrison
held out stubbornly in .Budapest. lo'ighting for
each block, it gradually withdrew to the area
of the Royal Castle on the west bank of the
Danube. The fierce battle for Budapest lind
the dcfenlle a.gainst the lInexpected Germa.n
offensive tied down f\. large number of Soviet
dividions which were ori~inally intended to push
on toward \·jenna. Yet the Sm'iets were
unable to prp\'ent the garrison of Budapest
some 30,000 wen, frotO breaking out tbrough
the SO\'jet ring on }l'ebruary 11 ami joining the
main (Jerman fighti.n~ line further to the Weilt.
Throughout thil! time the dfltaching n:aovement
of tbt' (J'rman Bl\lkan Drmy was oontinued
betwf'en Ihe River Drall and the Adriatic coast.
NlT~f8ERS
The pre:ient winter offensive between the
Carpatlllll.ns alld the Baltic-this it" revealed by
German ll.tl well lUI Soviet reportll-is the great-
est effort to have been made by the Soviets
in the course of this war. From the very first
instant they threw huge quantities of mon and
material into tbe fray. ~loreover, they had
brought up such n\.llt reserves that they could
afford continually to employ new divisions lUI
well a~ reinforce those weakened by the fierce
Gerwan rcsistance. According to German esti·
mates, U5 Soviet infantry divisions were involved
00 January IS, i.e., about a week after the
beginning of the offensive; one week luter, the
Dumber was 300. That means that on an
average 30 fresh divisiorHl were thrown into the
battle overy day during tho !lecoml week. By
the end of ,January the number of Soviet
troops. including tho tank anniel.l, involved in
the offcnllive amounted to more than 3 million
men, repr senting about one man for every foot
of front line.
In comparitlon to this the Gerllllln foret'S
employod were small. Indirectly the Soviets
themtlelv~1l have admitt.ed this. Uuring the
first two weeks of thc offensive, which brought
them the ~rellte t territorinl gains, even Soviet.
claillls (January 27) pllleed the figure of Germlln
priBollers taken at no morc than ~(i,UOO. It
goes wit.hout !laying t,hat this figure is more
!ikely to bc an overestimation than ILn under·
estimation: it also probably includes Illnny
members IIf formations :-Iuch as the VoIl:.tslllnll,
Labor Sen·ice. etc. Hence the actual number
of members of the lVeltTIIUlcAt-in thp. narrow
IICllse of the woro-t.aken prisoner during this
perioo, whit·h brought tho :::lo\'ietl! t,o Ih' gates
of llrcsluu Posell. EllJing, and KunigslJerg.
can IIII.rlil\" ha\'e alllount('(1 to mon' than lIome
twcntv tf,ousand. As the armored unit,,,, and
motorized troops of t hI' SO\'iets could luh'ance
far mure rnpidly than th Uermun t.roops eould
be withdrllwll, the smull number of (Jerlllau
prisoners allows no other conclu;;ioll thull thllt
the G('rllllLn Army (I) had unly ('ullljJul'uli\'c1y
weak units holding the frullt lull.", uf JllIlUar)'
12; (2) that it was able to withdraw part of
thcllo forces in goocl time; and (3) that th090
left behind continued to fight tenaciously even
wlu'n they found themsclves far behind tbe
front line and completely surrounded.
TACTICS
Ac'ording to the 8m'iet reporter P. Petro..·•
tht· armored and motorized unitll under Konyev
and .J ukov had nrdcr:-l "not to stop an)'where
to lJatter fortified lincli or fort.ificatiolls of the
elwrny. but to eircum\'ent them and con-
t.illUOlll1ly to increalK' the t~IDPO of ad\-ance
with mllximum speed. Those (;erman troops
which uffered resistance were to be lefl. to the
force'S following after." The bet!t eXllIDple of
tll('se tactics is the by-passing of Posen on
JWlIlIlry 2i/29. Jukov's armored spearheads
plUl80d the cit.y to the left and right, and 'it
was ollly lat,er involved in hea.vy fighting with
Soviet troops following in the wake of their
armored detachments.
Witb these tactics being employed, the size
of the battlefield and its Oat nature made it
\-ery difficult for the Germane to fight the
advancing armored troops to a stop once tbey
had broken through the front. In the great
pillin extending from the Carpathians to the
llo.Jtic there were enough areas where the
:::lovi I, tank armies could advance by avoiding
(JermllO centers of resistance, just as had been
donc in .I<~rance IllSt sumnlf'r by the US tank
armies after the breakthrough of Avranches.
Henco, if Jukov's tanks had not been dependent
on fuel und ammunition they might well have
contillued their advance, although with losses.
during the t·hinJ or fourth wtlCk. :Su it wall
only part of the Uerman objective tu parry
the :::loviet armored spearhead, us wms done
along the Oder. Fur more importunt WIUS the
task of cutting thom off from Ilupplios needed
for the (:ont.inuation of the battle. Even the
IUI'gest tlluk used in this winter olfensive. the
"Stulin Ta.nk" with its 12.2-em cannon, ill no
mor' thun a dead picce of iron if it has no fuel
or ammunition. The Soviets undoubtedly sent
off Konyev'g and Jukov's tank armies with
large fud llnd ammunition reserves to render
them independent of supplies as long as pos-
lSiblc, in a similllr manner &8 tbe Americana
have done with thcir task forces in the Pacifico
("The ltllilSians havo performed an unprec·
~dent(.-u feat in the way they gathered large
num bl'rs of armored vehicles into formations
nttl,d wit.h all the nCCl",S!llLr.v t'q uiJlIllf'nt," de·
c1arL'i1 u L:t'rmull (oornmentll,tor at tho ('nd of
Jllllullry.) Bill, at olle time or lInolht'r, the
monwnl mlli't· COlliI.' when the rCl1Cnoes carried
u(oflll lin' exhall,;tl'd lind additionlll muterial
IIII1·t 1,It, IJruught lip fWill tlte rear. To wake
Ihi IUOlucnt as urit it'll I as pO!SHiIJltl for the
Sll\'il'l.H WII,; I.he IlLl'Ik of tltt' (;I'rmllll clt>t.a 'It·
IUCIII.~ light illg fll r I(l Ilit' ('ast of tilt' J~('d :ipt:ar-
head". 1\vI. unly uid I.hl',)' attempt tv prevent
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the main bodies of the slower Soviet t.roops
from catching up with t.he tank armies: they
also endeavored to detltroy all supply routes,
railways, bridges, and highways in order to
disrupt the supplying of the t.ank armies.
It proved very tliAicult to carry this out, t.llC
Soviets having intent,ionally chosen the coldest
season for their offensive a.nd, moreover, beiJlg
favored by an except,ionally severe winter.
The cold weather had transformed the entire
terrain into one single surface passable for
vchicles, in atlvancing over which t.he Soviets
had to keep neither to britlges nor highways.
However, this condition will change with the
beginning of warmer weather. Then lakes and
rivers will be lakes a.nd rivers again, and Sovi~t
trucks, instead of being a.ble to roll across tields,
will have t,o stick to roads. Apart from polit-
ical considerations, t.his is the reason why
Stalin is in such a hurry.
The weather was responsible for the fact,
reported by bot.h sides, that the air arm played
a comparatively small role, especially during
.January. Not until the beginning of February
were planes employed more extensively. This
brought with it a perceptible alleviation for the
German ground forces by the Luftwaffe, which
attacked the tank spearheads-with Colonel
l~udel, the champion tank-bustcr, destroying
his 516th tank-a.,; well as t.he R.eu supply
columns and bridges and railways. Toward
the end of January and early in :Febrllary, the
German Navy also temporarily intervened in
the land bat.tles for the Samland Ptmin:'lula
(northwest of I\.onigsberg) and Elbing, without
so far having been invoh'ed in naval battles
with the Soviet fleet. The fact that German
troops are still in possession of Kurland and
the we. tern !;hore of the Bay of R.iga may be
in part responsible for the Soviet fleet. not yet
having appeared in the southern Baltic.
A NEW FEATURE
The eastern battles of the la~t fcw weeks are
r.Iistingui!'lhed from all former battles in that
for the first time the majority of them have
taken place on German soil. This has trans-
formed the war into one between t.he German
_\rmy and populat.ion on the one hand and the
R.ed Army on the other. The Volksst'Urm,
created on October 18, 1944, and representing
a German levy en masse, has for the first time
been sent into bat,tle on 11 large scale. Their
:'lpecial t.raining in the combating of tanks has
proved so sllccessful that the total number of
Soviet tanks destroyed in the first four weeks
hy all Germa.n formations-Army, Air Force,
:-;S, Volkllstunn-wns given by German sources
as 7,96G, a figure that !;taggeJ's the imagination.
The main weapon against tanks is the Pan::er-
ftlU,.st (tank fist), which made its first appearance
last summer on the in\'asion front in France
aud has meanwhile been improvetl to such an
ext,ent that it can be operated etIectively by
any Volksst'UTm man after a short training.
The former antitank weapons designed for the
use of individual soldiers consisted of attached
charges a.nd other cumulative charges, whose
effect depends on the enemy tank being ap-
proached directly by the soldier. This is, of
COUTse, a difficult feat that can only be carried
out by experienced men and in certain situa-
tions and is quite impossible when the attack-
ing tank is mo\ ing at a high speed. The Pan-
zeljaullt has obviated thcse difficulties, as it
The .. Panzerraust ..
can be employed at a considerable distance.
Although it is light in weight and ea"y to
manipulate, it is surprisingly effecti\'e c'oen
against the heaviest ta.nks, since it is able to
pierce armor plates up to 100 millimeters thick.
Its propulsion is bused on the rocket principle.
Projectile, propelling charge, and discharging
barrel are united in a "ingle piece, and the
soldier holds the barrel in his hands. The sight-
ing equipment is so simple t.hat e\'en au in-
expcrienced man is able to make hit.s at short
range.
The increasiJlgly direct inclusion and partic-
ipation of the entire population ill the fighting
has added to the responsibilities of organiza-
tions and persons not of a military natme in
the old sense of the word. The Volk.sslllrm,
although its members automatically rec:eive
the status of regular sultliers, is organized
by the Party !tnd includes t,he entire male
population between the ages of sixteen anu
sixty which has not previously been called up
for service in the armed forces. The huge
organization of evacuutions is in the hands of
the civil authorities. The importance of 1'1".
gional Party leaders, mayor!;, etc., in backing
up the defense of German soil has been re\·ealed
by many indications, a.s has the increa~illg role
of Heinrich Himmler who, as Commander in
Chief of the Home Army and the Volksslurm,
Minister of the Interior, and Head of the Police
and SS, holds one of the key positions in the
defense of the country. The close co-operation
between the old Weh,.,nacht and the new military
formations created during the last few months,
not foreseen by the Allies, is one of the reasons
why they have time and again had to change
the dates predicted for theu' victory.
Indicative of the attitude of the German
population is the fact that t.he Soviets, who
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ar fond of po.. ing lUI "liberat r of th
people,' have 0 far claim d nei h r in their
radio nor their pre!<8 that the German '·pro.
I tariat" ha haileo them an~'wher 118 "Jib ra-
t 'On tbe contrary. in th inrlu trial re-
gion of l'pper 'ile~ia the re i ·tance of tho
p pulat.ion wa particularly fierce. In al.l other
pIa e~, t o. the :-';o\'iet always empha'lze the
grimJl(~, of the r • i.-tance. An example from
the ..'o\-iet communique of January I!J:
TIo" fi~lll in fOI' tho town of PiIlkullen W88 very
bil t r. Tho (:ennnns defcnded tbemi'0lvo8 II) ,1.0
h U';€'" wil h th rll' f 111 II condell1lle<.1 10 d'lIth.
0" troop h d to til/ht for c\'cry hoWie. Enemy
\'ount rllttllCks cam one aiter onoth r.
Alter tho capture of Til/'lit, one of the big rest
;ermnll town to haye fallen into the bands of
tb ,o\·iet. '0 far, the Prm:d~ corre pondcnt
reported (Til it, :'7.1,45):
In th "11·cet. Iher ia not IL AI'llII to b Ileen. Tho
I' pulolion hns lon~ bl'Nl voeuutod. JI1 IIttics nlld
C IIRr 1'1 ff'w Gerllllln .oldier w re found.
But Til it had beell in th immediatc vicinity
of t he front sin e the BUill mer of I fl-H IlIltl
could IhC'rcfore be enleualed in good time Ill1d
in c mplet ord'r, It was not cver.\...... lwre
that the 'oviet w re confronted with the eenc
of uttedv evaeuatf'd town. In many cases
a.nd in In; area, the advnnce of the motorized
f'O\-j arrnie wa. 100 quick to allow of thi..
.For th' :erman a. well as the non-G rman
P Jlulation of the territorics overrun by thc
•'o\'iet . t he last few weeks were a tragetl~' on
a n\, tell'. Rut the G rman population hnd
pr \·iousl." alrently gone through s \'ere teo t
/lnd hL'; learned in five and a half years of wnr
l'tl1d hUl1drcds f l1i~hts of bombing to bear lip
undC'r h rd -hip and danger, Although we find
many f ,tutti rf'port s in t he German pre on
th tC'rrible conF;N{llences of t.he h,Ulty evaeua·
tion of hun Ired of thousands engulfed by the
war in thf' mid, t of wintPr Ilnd on th atrocitie.
committed bv the, 'o'iet.. we find jll·t as many
pr ofs of the' nation's lInflinl'hing dt'lcrmina.t~on
to CIlITY on, Th sufIering of tht' poplllntlon
of eu.~t~rn German\' today is onlv pnrt of the
acrifi eon. tant I~- being made 'by the ent ire
nation in this war and by which it intcnds to
gain victory and exi. tencc. . .
The totnl numb r of German' 11"11)0' before
the bCj!inning of the ovi,t offen i\'e in the
territorie;\ occupied or surrounoed by the
•'oviE't Rlllountcd t.o some i! million. We do
not kn w how 111 A11 \' of then~ were vacuAt I:
arcording t a, 'Pll11 ("h ob ·en-er. 4 to 5 millionc,
The filet that thi/'l figure i" not greatl'r i du to
the rr1pidily f \'pnts am) tht' inclu ion of
almn<t I hI' wholp male popul tion in the dt'ta 'h.
menl of the roll., 's!urlll. The, 'O\·iet. them.
sp)n',.; wr(ll' in nn art ide cntitlcd "On tho
] ond' (,f (:ermaJ1\"': "All immell e proportion
f h (: rman ,;opulation did nnt . lIcce-ed in
bcin o '\'aeuntNI" (11.:?~.j): and It .erman
omnHlntlltorexpl ined the, ta.yin~ be-hind of the
able·bodicd population by the foil wing imile:
When 6 diko bursts, the peopl living behind th
diko do 110 k safety lJy running own)'•. for the)'
know thnt tho wnter i. bound 10 (,Olel, up with them.
The\' remn;1I lit th dik· in order to do Iheir h at to
fill ~p the 1001".,. or go to 'h higlo I elo.,,6.\; II • whor
t h' flood WilY surround II m bu ~\llIlOI ron h them
at ouee.
OVITT EFFORT
How wa it po. ~ibl that the German Army,
which a few v 'ar' Il 0 ad \-anc d by trem nelous
victories to'th ,"olga and th peak of th
Caucru u • wa oblilYeel in the eour e of a bout
two \'ear to 0 ba~k to the Oder! The prin-
cipal" explanation i I rubably the fa t that.
Germany i onducting a war on two front
or, to be morc exact. a war in nil directions of
the compa ---and that he i oppo ~ b\- a
coalit.ion of three world pow rs of which th
Sovict "Union has directed aU its ·trcngt,h
agllinst her, England almost all her strength,
and America 11 \'en' considerable part of her
strength. Thi. \"Cr~' fllct forc d Gennany to
employ a strategy radicall~- differt>nt from that
follow·d by h r in th ~. ars Hl31-l/42, wh('n she
carrit>d out major op rations on ODe front at n
timc onl\'.
Furtb~rmore. we must. bear in mind that. the
Soviet l nion was the first power to have car·
ried out total mohilization, alt1l0. t from the
fir t dav of thc war ami to a much largc·r extent
than tile other::;, ha \'ing introduced on October
I, HHI, what WilS called the t·.;eobllch, viz ..
militnry training f r lllmost the en.tire. adult
p l'ulation. Th •\)\'iels bad at theIr dl po!'al
a \'/1 t territ n' in and b( hind th /'al!', nd w d
wit h rich mine-raJ, resources und protccted
ag in. t any en my raid ~Y ,it. geographic, I
po. ilion, for O\'er the O\'lC Gon'rJ\ment
had true to it S\'st,em an I to the nature
of it. inhabitants, ·with unparalleled rut/de. s-
ne~ extracted the utmost in troops /llltl lnbor
from its p pulation. And finally it had r -
c i\'pd largo armament suppli s particularly
from Ameriru. In u statement i.-;1u('d b~'
Economic Administrator Leo T. Crowley in
"a hington on February I-with th obvious
intt>ntion of impr tling the o\'ieL with the
fact that Iht, Ameri'lI.l1;1 had contributed their
share in th Red offen. i\'e-th following figure-.
on U,' Lenel-Lea I' d \i\'crie to the l' ','R Ill'
to Dc ember I. I~H4, were given:
,l3I,I}/lO fiuloll'luI.Jiles find llllcks
12.~I)O I'llUll'
Il, n\)O I OJ LkJ,
I.U4.; I 'om i\'e
j, Ill,' Ant 01
294.noo lot of explo i\'es
2,12U.U 0 tOil:' of "teel
The reporl add It n in many _ ctor, of the
Ea. tern Fr nt III r than hAlf of th ._'o'iet
,,;uppl.\' en'i', wa carried on \111 'rican-pr tluced
\'chicle ,
on ET TR t: BLF
1'l1£' fact that the .. ' viet Union ba been on
tb offen i\' for lU re thall two .y aI'" ha
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captured wide expanses of Eastern Europe,
and bl\s now advanced deep into German ter·
ritory, Ims made such an impression upon the
worlcl that people arc inclined to overlook
existing weaknesses, all tbe more so since tbese
are lcss ,-isible in n country so hermetically
eealed to the outer world tban in any other
country.
. In a number of articles appearing in this
magazine, we have already drawn attention to
various significant weak points within tbe
Soviet Union. Tbe fact that our analyses of
So\"il't affairs are not far off the mark has
recently been indirectly acknowledged by a
Soviet paper in Shanghai. In a four-column
criticism of those of our magazine's articles
dealing with the USSR that paper confined
itself to generalities and vituperation, making
no a,ttempt to answer a single one of our argu-
ments. To answer these arguments, which are
not based on imagination but on a thorough
st.udv of facts taken from Soviet sources, would
requ'ire an equally thorough study and is not
eR.!>'y for people who have never been in the
USSR, as many of the contributors of that
paper, or not even in RU88ia, as the author of
that, particular article.
We can fully appreciate that long years of
refugee life have given a number of Russians
the desire to cease being people without a
country and caused them to apply for Soviet
citizenship. Once they have taken this step, it
is only natural for them to want to see the
USSR in as rosy a color as pos.'lible and to
drown ont their secret fears of Bolshevism by
taking e"erything that the So\·iets write at its
face value. For suoh people we have but one
advice: not to read our articles if they disturb
their illusions and peace of mind.
Here we shall discllss a few weak points which
have become particularly apparent during the
last few months.
Above all, there is the extraordinary strain
on t.he reserves of manlJower. In discussing
previous So,oiet offensives, we have never said
that they represented the utilization of the last
resources. But that even the human reserves
of the USSR are not inexhaWltible can be
deduced from va.rious indications. The number
of Soviet citizens who have fallen, been taken
prisoner, been seriously wounded, evacuated
from Soviet territories to the West, who perished
during the Soviet evacuations, a.nd who fell
victim to the hard living and working condi·
tions in the USSR, amount.s. according to con-
sen-at,ive estimat~s, to at lenst 25 million
}X'ople. To mobilize more and more new
armics, the Soviets had to exploit those who
remained in industry and agriculture to such
an extent that-as is reveall'd bv the Soviet
pre. and radio-there is practically no longer
any limitation of working hours and norms,
and that large numbers of workers are forced
to sleep at their working places in order to
save time. The measures of ceaseless pressure
on the workers which we described in "Behind
Soviet Produotion" (Novembe.r 1944) are con·
stantly being increased by now ones. The
lat~st invention is "AgarkovislD." The Soviet
Government alwavs endeavors to create the
impl'f'88ion that ali such methods arise sponta-
neously from ";thin the ranks of the workers
and hence names them, as in the case of "Stakh·
anovism." after individual workerll. The new
method, which was allegedly invented by onl-
Yegor Agarkov, consists in several "working
brigades"-as the individua,1 groups of workers
of a factory are called-uniting to carry out
together the work that was formerly done
individually by each group and in this way to
save the work of a few brigade leaders and a
number of workers.
Another serioWl bottleneck is represented by
the system of transportation. The shifting of
the Soviet economic center of gravity to the
east, the slow progress of reconstroction in the
reconquered areas, and the advancing of the
front into Central Europe. have extended the
supply lines of the Red Army tremendously.
The bulk of the war material must be trans·
ported from industrial centers in the Urals or
in Siberia through regions devastated by war
over thou811nds of kilometers (the distance from
Magnitogorsk to the lower Oder is 3,000 kilo·
meters) to the front.
The front demands more and more locomotivClll.
more and more railway carriages, an' increaaingly
rapid traftlc on the extending routes of oommunication.
The area behind the front is demanding increlUling
transportll of coul, ore, grain, timber. metals, and other
important freights. (/svutiya, 20.12.44.)
Press and radio are full of complaints about
the inadequate efficiency of the system of
transportation. In December, for instance, the
breakdown of the Tomsk railway line, over
which a large part of the coal and ore transports
of western Siberia are moved, was announced
(Pravda, 23.12.44).
RADIO BLACKOUT
While the RU88ian population took a per-
sonal interest in the war as long as it believoo
that it was a "war for the liberation of its
fatherland," it is far less interested in a war
being conducted in Hungary, Silesia, and
Pomerania. In "The End of Soviet Isolation"
(December 1944) we already pointed to the
danger arising to the Soviet regime from the
fact that, after twent:r-five years of complete
seclusion from the rest of the world, millioll8
of its subjects are now able, 8B a result of the
advance of the Red Army into Central Europe,
to find ont for themselvcs how conditions are
in territories outside of the Soviet Union. .
To what lengths the seclusion of the Soviet
population is being carried is shown, for in·
stance, by the way in which the radio system
is organized in the USSR. Apart from a tilly
number of privileged people, ordinary Soviet
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citizens do not possess radio recClvIDg sets.
They can only listen to loudspeakeri' installed
in their home, working places, clubs and meet-
ing hnlls, all of which are wired to one of t.he
7,000 or so broadcast,ing centers (rad'imlse/) run
by the propagandlL departments of various
Party organizations. These centers pick up
the daily transmissions from Moscow and
other Soviet broauca.sting . ta.tions throughuut
the country (there are 128 in all), and a program
is then compiled from the e transmissions to
suit-according to the ideas of the Party prop-
agandists - the mentality of the population
under their supervision. Moscow recently an-
notUlccd tha.t the number of loudspeakerR-
5~ million before the war-was to be increased
by another million by t.he end of IO'lil; no
1"11ent,ion was made of receiving sets as are in
use everywhere else in the world. Moreover,
:\. Puzin, the President of th<" Radio Committee
of the Council of People's Commissars of the
USSR. asserted:
Radioficat ion by means of wiring is and wi U obvious.
I~' continue for a long time to be I he muin trend in
the rlldiofication of our country. (Pra"~/(I, lti.12.4.I.)
This double sifting of Soviet programs and
the absolute impossibility of listening to any
fureign broadcasting station explains the fact
that the radio, too, cannot supply the ill-
habitants of the Soviet Union wit,h any other
im pression of the rest of the world than that
desired by the Party.
The men' of t,he Red Army, having been fed
for years with the idea that they themselves
were living in a paradise while all other nations
were suffering, are apparently so amazed at the
high stamlaru of livillg of the people olltside
the So,-iet Union, especially in Germany, that
So,-iet propaganda is straining every effort to
obliterate tbis impression. Since the end of
.lanuary it has been using a trick which strikes
one as very funny. On February 15, Comrade
Starikov, a war reporter on the I Ukrainian
.Front, declared in a broadcast from MOReow :
"At first when we entered Germall homes,
our soldiers were greatly surprised at thtl
abundance of goods the Germans owned. But
later on they found that these were mostly of
Soviet manufacture." This theme appears in
countless articles and radio reports. The Tass
correspondent P. Nikitcb, to give another
example, telegraphed the following whopper
from Silesia on February 8 in a report about
things he saw in a German house:
A med icine clLbinet. I II 1ho cabinet thero are a lot
of Hterilized b~lIldages wit h the brand "Leningrad
<'otton Trust." Here is LL (Aluingrad gramophone.
Over there ure some tennis ral'kets l1lurked "Dynamo"
Il\ well·known Soviet sporl, organization J. In the
houdoir ( find eall de cologne aud pcrfumes of Teje
nnd shoes of the Paris Commune fnotory [bolh well-
known Soviet concerns] ann silk linlZorie wilh lahels
reading "By ordpr of the Cent,ral Department Store
of the People's Commissariat for Trade". . . . In
almost evory villuf.!'o one can see paper frem Dobrush,
mat,ches from Reehitsa, u",rricultural machinery from
R08tov-thousands of Roviet things. . .. Our Lieu-
tenant Shlloronov even found a sewing mal'hine froll
Lis factor)' in Podolsk.
WHAT REALLY CO NTS
More important than the weak points within
the f;oviet Union for the further course of tho
war is the attitude of t.hc German nation.
Lieutenant General Dittmar, outstanding Gf'r-
man war commentator, recently explained this
attitude, and we can do no bett~r than quote
hi:'l words:
The fUIldamental idea that, must be inherent in flnv
armed conflict has bpcn reversed und lost 'ven' ~hred
of menning. According to C'lausewitz, t.he pu;po e of
every armed action is to place Ihe 0rponent in tlo
situat ion in which t he pressure he experiences i
grcntcr thun the political ~acrifices to be imposed in
Ihe case of capitulation. What is now bein~ demanded
from the Gennan people is no more ami no lesi< Ihan
suicide hy their own choice, the proposed unconditional
surrender repreflenting the noose which is t,o strunglo
liS. But there is no nlt,ernutive. H is not a matt,er
of eit,her one t,hing or another: we ure only supposcd
to choose bo>twoon two pl\ths which, accorning to Ihe
wishes of our enemics, nre both to lead t{) the same
goal. That, incidentally, the pat,h le.n.d.ing hy way of
surrendcr is the more convenient one for the enemy
goes wit hout saying. It is t-o his very own interest,
to lure us ont-o this pat,h, since every day of German
rcsistunc(' forces him too to make bOlmdless sacrifices.
gnaws llt his national slrengt h. "nd raises problcm~
at. home as weU as in I he occupied countries which
would be at lenst temporaril~' solved or adjourned
by an unconditional German surrendpr.
,"Ve nre fully awnre of t,he st rain placed npon our
Gerrnlln people at Ihe present moment. The dislrc.-
among the t'('fugees and evacuees the unbelievable
stra·in imposed upon the t.roops at Ihe front, the suffer·
ing of those nffticted by t he air raids, cannot be over·
looked by anyone moving aroWld witb opeu ey~
t1uriJIl; these times. But all I his is not worse thRn "he
fate in store for Germa.ny were she to lay down her
arms Wlconditionally. Not those are t,he prolongers
of this war ..... ho, in view of so uJlren..'lOnable a demand,
are calling for resistance to the utmost: it is those
whose idea of peace is the deathly quiet of a graveyard
over Germany. In the face of sueh pe""pectivc', a
fight t-o the bitter end is not only the urgent nictate
of necessity but, even UIlder the most painful concli.
tions, an actual relief, because action is always hel,ter
thllJ1 the apathetic submission to which t·he enemy
wishes to condemn 118 ••••
\\'e are t,reading a narrow path, threatened on
both sides by a headlong fall. Onl~' ('alm, poised
steps, with eyes turned forward, and above aU a sure
handling of our means of balllJlce, can I_d us to our
goal. No one can wish t,o see this path extended
beyond the field of ,,·ision. But no one can reasonably
dema.nd that we voluntarily discard our balancing
pole-the a.rmed forces which alone can guarantee
our safety and whose blows the enemy still fear;;-
and fling ourselves into the abyss of capitulation.
In connect,ion with these words, Ge!leral
Dittmar recalls a remark of Frederick the
Grent's which the latt,er made in one of the
dark hours of the Seven Years' ·War, when
there was no visible prospect of his ultimate
victory:
"I shall have to continue to ba.Iance on the
high rope, always trying to keep from falling;
but I shall also see to it that from tim€' to
time I give my enemies a crack on the head
with my balancing pole."
